From an Aristotelian point of view, some of the epistemology of mathematics ought to be easy, in principle. If mathematics is about such properties of real things as symmetry and continuity, it should be possible to observe those properties in things, and so the epistemology of mathematics should be no more problematic than the epistemology of colour. An Aristotelian point of view should solve the epistemology problem at the same time as it solves the problem of the applicability of mathematics, by showing that mathematics deals directly with properties of real things.
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Plainly there are some difficulties with that plan. It may be hard to explain knowledge of some of the larger and more esoteric mathematical structures such as infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, which are not instantiated in anything observable. It will even be problematic for such concepts as a 100-sided polygon, which may be instantiated but which are complex enough to confuse the sense organs. Nevertheless, it would be impressive if the plan worked for some simple mathematical structures, even if it did not work for all.
It would be desirable if an epistemology of mathematics could fulfil these requirements: avoid both Platonist implausibilities involving contact with a world If those requirements could be met, there would be little remaining motivation either for postulating Platonist intuition of forms or inference to abstract entities, or for trying to represent mathematics as tautologous or trivial (so as not to have to postulate a Platonist intuition or inference).
Those requirements can be met -but there is still a degree of mystery involved in the transition from straightforward perceptual knowledge of quantity and structure to the more intellectual knowledge of mathematics strictly so called.
Mathematical knowledge arises in three stages, corresponding to the classical distinction between perception, imagination and intellect. Actually instantiated, sufficiently simple quantities and structures can be straightforwardly perceived, by both humans and animals. That sort of mathematical knowledge is the subject of this chapter. In the next chapter, we will see how imagination, rebranded visualization, can extend the range of knowledge beyond what is actually perceived, to properties that are not instantiated or are instantiated but not perceived. Imagination has its limits, however, and the intellect aided by proof can extend the range of mathematical knowledge far beyond what can be imagined.
Aristotelian epistemology (at least in its early stages, dealing with simple perceptual knowledge) has a very different character from Platonist or nominalist epistemology. It is much more naturalized and close to cognitive science. The Platonist has to explain knowledge of abstract entities by either intuition or inference. The nominalist has to show that mathematical knowledge may be achieved by logical or linguistic means or by manipulation of formal symbols. Constructivists or Kantians have to show how the resources of the human mind create mathematics. None of those approaches naturally gel with cognitive science or perceptual psychology. Aristotelians, on the other hand, regard basic mathematical knowledge as arising from perception of the mathematical properties of the physical world. So from an Aristotelian perspective, epistemology
